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Summary.
The marginalization paradox involves a disagreement between two Bayesians who use two
different procedures for calculating a posterior in the presence of an improper prior. We show
that the argument used to justify the procedure of one of the Bayesians is inapplicable. There
is therefore no reason to expect agreement, no paradox, and no evidence that improper priors
are inherently inconsistent. We show further that the procedure in question can be interpreted
as the cancellation of infinities in the formal posterior. We suggest that the implicit use of this
formal procedure is the source of the observed disagreement.
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1. Introduction.
An important question in statistics is whether Bayesian inference can be extended to the
setting of improper priors in a consistent and intuitively viable manner. The use of im-
proper priors was common throughout much of the twentieth century, and appears to be a
useful idealization for many applications. In the 1970s, however, two influential arguments
appeared against the use of improper priors: the “marginalization paradox,” and “strong
inconsistency.” These arguments appear to have convinced most statisticians that improper
priors must be abandoned.
In this paper we discuss the marginalization paradox, due to Dawid, Stone, and Zidek
(1973) (DSZ73). Let p(x|θ) be a normalized sampling distribution with parameter θ = (η, ζ)
and data x = (y, z), and let p(θ) be a prior, which may be improper, i.e., of infinite total
probability. The marginalization paradox concerns the problem of calculating p(ζ|z), under
a certain set of assumptions. A first Bayesian, B1, eliminates η and then y; a second
Bayesian, B2, eliminates y and then η. The details of the procedures are given in DSZ73.
It is claimed that these procedures rely only on principles that would have to hold in any
intuitively viable theory of inference. If p(θ) is improper, however, B1 and B2 generally get
incompatible answers. It has been widely inferred that any extension of Bayesian inference
to the context of improper priors will be inconsistent.
The purpose of this paper is to show that the marginalization paradox does not imply
that the use of improper priors will lead to inconsistency. First, we show that the argument
used to justify B1’s elimination of y is invalid, because it is based on the application of
probabilistic intuitions to a formal quantity whose probabilistic meaning has not been jus-
tified. The “paradox” is thereby resolved, since we now have no reason to believe that B1’s
answer is correct, and no reason to insist that the answers of B1 and B2 be compatible.
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Second, we analyze B1’s procedure on its own terms, to get a better sense for what
is being assumed. The posterior p(ζ|z) is defined as a ratio, which is only formal when
the prior is improper because there are infinities in the numerator and denominator. B1’s
procedure is equivalent to the assumption that these infinities will cancel. What DSZ73
have shown, therefore, is that there is no consistent extension of Bayesian inference in which
the cancellation law, assumed implicitly by B1, holds when the prior is improper. But this
is only to be expected: it is analogous to the well-known fact that there is no consistent
extension of arithmetic to the extended real numbers in which the cancellation law holds
for infinity. The proposal that we abandon improper priors because of the marginalization
paradox is analogous to the proposal that we abandon the use of infinity because it does
not obey the laws of arithmetic.
In brief, the inconsistency of the marginalization paradox is based on an assumption that
has not been justified intuitively and that is unreasonable mathematically. There is nothing
in the marginalization paradox to preclude the existence of a formalism that justifies the
careful use of improper priors.
2. The intuitive argument.
In this section we show that the validity of B1’s argument has not been established, because
it is based on an intuitive probabilistic argument, and the distribution to which it is applied
has not been shown to have a probabilistic meaning. In other words, we show that DSZ73
have not made their case, because their argument contains a gap.
In addition to the assumptions described in Section 1, we assume the following:
(1) The formal posterior, defined as
p(ζ|y, z) =
∫
p(y, z|η, ζ) p(η, ζ) dη∫
p(y, z|η, ζ) p(η, ζ) dη dζ
, (1)
is independent of y. We denote the common value by p1(ζ|z). Note that the value of
p(ζ|y, z) and the validity of the assumption itself depend on the prior.
(2) The marginalized sampling distribution,
p(z|η, ζ) =
∫
p(y, z|η, ζ) dy
is independent of η. We denote the common value by p2(z|ζ).
(3) For each value of ζ, the prior is improper in η:
∫
p(η, ζ) dη = ∞.
Assumptions 1 and 2 enable B1 and B2, respectively, to invoke intuitive arguments to
determine p(ζ|z), even though the formal calculations would lead to infinities. Assumption 3
is satisfied by all of the examples in DSZ73, and reflects the fact that we are really interested
in impropriety in η.
We focus on only one aspect of the analysis in DSZ73, because we believe that aspect
to be the source of all of the difficulties. The aspect in question is B1’s elimination of y,
which occurs after he has already marginalized over η. B1 assumes that since p(ζ|y, z) is
independent of y, then p(ζ|z) must be equal to the y-independent value of this function.
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The justification that DSZ73 give for this assumption is intuitive, and has been for-
malized as the “reduction principle,” which is stated as follows in Dawid, Stone, and Zidek
(1996): “Suppose that a general method of inference, applied to data (y, z), leads to an
answer that in fact depends on z alone. Then we should obtain the same answer if we
apply the method to z alone.” The principle enables one to determine the answer to the
problem with data z from the answer to the problem with data (y, z), provided that the
latter answer depends only on z. We have no objection to this principle as stated. We wish
to emphasize, however, that in order to apply the principle (or invoke the intuition behind
the principle), we must first have the “answer” to a problem of inference, given data (y, z).
The problem with B1’s argument is that p(ζ|y, z) has not been shown to be the “answer”
to a problem of inference, so the reduction principle is inapplicable. We show below that in
the context of the marginalization paradox, any sampling distribution p(y, z|ζ) associated
with p(ζ|y, z) is necessarily improper, so that it has no inherent probabilistic meaning.
There is no reason to assume that the associated formal posterior will have any probabilistic
meaning, even if that posterior is proper. In the absence of such a meaning, p(ζ|y, z) is
not the answer to a problem of inference, B1 is unable to use the reduction principle to
complete his argument, and the inconsistency vanishes.
We are not claiming that it is impossible to provide a meaning for an improper distribu-
tion. Indeed, such an assumption would preclude the use of improper priors and prejudge
the whole issue. We are merely observing that in order to use the reduction principle, a
probabilistic meaning must be provided for p(y, z|ζ), and this has not been done. Even if
a meaning is provided, any manipulations of the distribution must be justified in terms of
that meaning, and there is no guarantee that the resulting procedures will be the formal
analogs of valid procedures for proper distributions.
We now establish the impropriety of the sampling distribution.
Proposition: Let p(η, ζ) be given, and let p(η, ζ) = p(η|ζ) p(ζ) be any factorization of
p(η, ζ) such that 0 < p(ζ) < ∞. Under the above assumptions we have, for each ζ,
∫
p(y, z|ζ) dy = ∞. (2)
Proof:
∫
p(y, z|ζ) dy =
1
p(ζ)
∫
p(y, z|η, ζ)p(η, ζ) dη dy =
p2(z|ζ)
p(ζ)
∫
p(η, ζ) dη = ∞.
The interchange in the order of integration is justified by Tonelli’s theorem. 
An immediate corollary is that
∫
p(y, z|ζ) dy dz = ∞. The factorization of p(η, ζ) is
nonunique, and this implies a nonuniqueness in the definition of p(y, z|ζ). The proposition
shows, however, that impropriety of the conditional distribution is independent of the choice
of factorization. Note also that although we are evaluating B1’s argument, the proof depends
on assumption (2), which was made for B2’s benefit.
3. The formal argument.
We now consider B1’s procedure on its own terms, as a formal procedure. We find that in the
case of a proper prior, B1’s use of the reduction principle is equivalent to the cancellation of a
finite factor in a ratio defining p(ζ|z), and in the case of an improper prior, to the cancellation
of an infinite factor. It is well-known that the formal cancellation of infinities will generally
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lead to inconsistencies. We conclude that when viewed formally, B1’s procedure is highly
suspect.
In general, the posteriors of ζ given (y, z) and given z are given formally by the following
expressions:
p(ζ|y, z) =
p(y, z, ζ)∫
p(y, z, ζ) dζ
, and (3)
p(ζ|z) =
∫
p(y, z, ζ) dy∫
p(y, z, ζ) dy dζ
. (4)
Under Assumption 1, p(ζ|y, z) is independent of y. Then
p(y, z, ζ) = p(y, z) p1(ζ|z), (5)
where p(y, z) =
∫
p(y, z, ζ)dζ. Substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (4), we obtain
p(ζ|z) =
∫
p(y, z) p1(ζ|z) dy∫
p(y, z) p1(ζ|z) dy dζ
. (6)
When
∫
p(y, z)dy is finite, then p(ζ|z) = p1(ζ|z).
If we also make Assumptions 2 and 3, the proposition implies that
∫
p(y, z) dy = ∞.
The assumption that p(ζ|z) = p1(ζ|z) is now equivalent, as claimed, to the assumption that
it is permissible to cancel infinite factors of
∫
p(y, z) dy from the ratio defining p(ζ|z).
4. Discussion.
We have observed that the inconsistencies uncovered in DSZ73 depend on formal manip-
ulation on the part of B1. We have shown, in Sections 2 and 3, respectively, that B1’s
procedure has not been justified intuitively, and is suspect mathematically. We therefore
see no reason to accept B1’s reasoning, or to regard the validity of this reasoning as nec-
essary or desirable in any extension of Bayesian inference to improper priors. Once B1’s
reasoning is rejected, the marginalization paradox disappears.
The core of our argument is the observation that B1’s argument is formal because the
sampling distribution p(y, z|ζ) is improper. To the best of our knowledge, this observation
has not been made previously. The impropriety of the sampling distribution has perhaps
been obscured by its nonuniqueness and by the fact that the formal posterior can be calcu-
lated from Eq. (1) without ever computing the sampling distribution explicitly.
Previous analyses of the marginalization paradox generally accepted the validity of both
Bayesians’ arguments. The problem then becomes one of understanding when and why the
two Bayesians will agree. This analysis was initiated in DSZ73, which is mostly dedicated
to this question. It turns out that for problems amenable to group analysis, consistency
may be achieved by a uniquely determined prior. The priors determined by this constraint,
however, are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons, which DSZ73 explore in detail. They
conclude that an acceptable theory is elusive or unachievable.
The most persistent and insightful critic of the marginalization paradox has been the
late E. T. Jaynes. Cf. Jaynes (1980a); Dawid et al. (1980); Jaynes (1980b); Dawid et al.
(1996); Jaynes (2003), for his extended debate with the authors of DSZ73. We believe that
at the conceptual level, Jaynes’ critique was fundamentally correct, in that he identified
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the source of the inconsistencies as the formal manipulation of completed infinities. A
particularly elegant statement of this view can be found in Jaynes (2003). At the technical
level, Jaynes did not recognize that B1’s argument was invalid, so he was forced to try to
determine how the two Bayesians could be reconciled. His thesis was that the disagreement
between the Bayesians reflected differences in their prior information. In our opinion, this
analysis was not entirely successful, and the correct approach is to reject B1’s reasoning.
For general background on the marginalization paradox and related issues, we refer the
reader to the excellent review article of Kass and Wasserman (1996).
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